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Abstract
We propose a new type segmented antineutrino detector made of plastic
scintillators for the nuclear safeguard application. A small prototype was
built and tested to measure background events. A satisfactory unmanned
field operation of the detector system was demonstrated. Besides, a detailed
Monte Carlo simulation code was developed to estimate the antineutrino
detection efficiency of the detector.
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1. Introduction
Nuclear power plants are the most intense man-controlled sources of neu-
trinos. With an average energy of about 200MeV released per fission and
about 6 neutrinos produced along the β-decay chain of the fission products,
a total flux of 2 × 1020ν/s is emitted by a 1-GWt power plant. Since un-
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stable fission products are neutron-rich nuclei, all β-decays are of β− type
and the neutrino flux is actually of pure electron antineutrinos (ν¯e). A pre-
diction of its production rate and spectrum associated with the fission of
235U,238U,239Pu and 241Pu exists and was recently revisited[1][2][3].
The International Atomic Energy Agency uses an ensemble of procedures
and technologies, collectively referred to as the Safeguards Regime, to de-
tect diversion of fissile materials from civil nuclear fuel cycle facilities into
weapons programs. One can ensure by measuring antineutrinos that a reactor
was not stopped or started with unusual frequency. Moreover, the rate and
energy spectrum measurements enable a non-intrusive, real-time estimate of
instantaneous and integrated thermal power and provide the information of
the isotopic content of the in-core fuel.
Such a concept of antineutrino detection was first performed by a Russian
group at the Rovno Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine[4]. Recently another ex-
periment has been done at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in the
USA using organic-liquid-scintillator detector with cubic meter scale in an
underground gallery[5],[6]. They demonstrated a clear correlation between
the changes in the reactor antineutrino emission rate and the evolution of
the reactor power and fissile inventory[7]. These experiments have shown
practical capabilities suitable for near term use in the safeguards context.
In addition, a study of neutrino detection with a compact liquid scintilla-
tor detector deployed at the ground level was recently carried out at the
experimental fast reactor in Japan[8].
To improve the safety characteristics and make deployments and oper-
ations easier, use of plastic detectors has some advantages. Current liquid
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scintillators are usually based on organic solvents and therefore have some
security (toxicity and flammability) issues, chemical compatibility with the
container (they are good solvents) and need complicated retaining structures.
Additionally, detector mobility, simple installation and sea-level opera-
tion of detectors, rather than underground have great impact for safeguards
applications.
Taking above points into account, we propose a simple and mobile an-
tineutrino detector, “PANDA”, which stands for Plastic Anti-Neutrino De-
tector Array. The detector is made of plastic scintillators. It can be installed
on a dry van and placed outside of a reactor building (easily accessible zone).
Although these features have advantages in safeguards applications, there
are some drawbacks. Using plastic scintillators leads to some reduction in
overall detection efficiency due to their smaller number of protons per vol-
ume comparing to typical liquid scintillators used in other neutrino exper-
iments. Furthermore, above-ground detection is a challenge because of the
backgrounds induced by cosmic rays. For inverse-beta detectors, the corre-
lated background event rate at sea-level may increase substantially relative
to underground detectors.
In this paper, we report on the details of the proposed PANDA detector
and also the performance of a small prototype called Lesser PANDA.
2. Detector layout
The PANDA detector consists of modules made of plastic scintillator bars
(10cm×10cm×100cm) wrapped with aluminized Mylar films and gadolinium
(Gd) coated Mylar films (4.9 mg of Gd per cm2). Each bar is connected to
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Figure 1: individual module structure
acrylic light guides and photomultipliers on both ends (Fig. 1). The plastic
scintillators are Rexon RP-408 and the Gd coated films are manufactured
by Ask Sanshin Engineering with their neutron shielding paint. Hamamatsu
H6410 (R329-02) PMTs are used for light detection.
Antineutrinos are detected via the inverse beta decay process:
ν¯e + p→ e+ + n (1)
and following reactions:
e+ + e− → 2γ, (2)
n + 155Gd→ 156Gd∗ → 156Gd+ γ’s, (3)
n + 157Gd→ 158Gd∗ → 158Gd+ γ’s. (4)
Here the antineutrino ν¯e interacts with the proton p which is present in
the plastic scintillator. The neutron n and the positron e+ are detected by
delayed coincidence, providing a dual signature allowing strong rejection of
the much more frequent singles backgrounds due to natural radioactivity or
cosmogenic neutrons.
The positron deposits energy via Bethe-Bloch ionization as it slows in
the scintillator, and upon annihilation with an electron, it emits two gamma
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Figure 2: Light propagation model in the plastic scintillator bar
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Figure 3: Logarithm of the ratio of PMT charge measured at one end to charge at the
other end of the module vs. source position. The dashed curve is a two-parameter (p and
l in equation (5)) fit of the ratio predicted by the light attenuation model.
rays which can deposit additional energy of up to 1.022MeV (reaction (2)).
On the other hand the neutron carries away a few keV of energy from the
antineutrino interaction and is detected by capture in a Gd on the film with
an energy release of ≈ 8MeV via a gamma ray cascade (reactions (3) and
(4)). Reaction (1) has an energy-dependent cross section and a neutrino
energy threshold of 1.806MeV.
The light intensity ratio seen by each PMT pair allows one to estimate the
position of the hit along the module. Assuming the fraction p of the light is
attenuated in the plastic scintillator exponentially as a function of distance
from the point of emission to the PMT and the other (1 − p) propagates
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practically without attenuation by repeating total internal reflection at the
surface (Fig. 2), the hit position and the light intensity are related through
a simple equation:
LPMT = Lemitted((1− p) + p exp (−x/l)). (5)
In this equation, Lemitted and LPMT are the light intensity emitted by the
scintillator and reaching the PMT, l is the attenuation length of scintillation
light, and x is the distance of the hit position from the PMT. Fig. 3 shows
that the above relation (5) fits the data well. Using the position of the hit and
the charge outputs from each PMT, one can estimate the energy deposit of
the hit. The position and energy resolutions which depend on the deposited
energy are about 30 cm and 110 keV for 500 keV hit (10 cm and 300 keV for
4MeV hit) on the center respectively.
The dependence of the Gd neutron capture efficiency on plastic scin-
tillator granularity and shape were calculated using the simulation toolkit
Geant4[9], which offers C++ libraries for simulating the passage of particles.
Three types of Gd loading methods were considered: dissolving Gd in plastic
scintillators (0.1%wt), placing 25µm-thick Gd foils (2.0×10−2g/m2) between
scintillator plates (6 cm, 10 cm and 14 cm thick) or wrapping square bars of
plastic scintillators (cross-sectional dimensions of 6cm× 6cm , 10cm× 10cm
and 14cm × 14cm) with 25µm-thick Gd foils. In the simulation, the total
dimensions in three axes were taken to be infinite.
Ten kiloelectronvolt neutrons were generated at a single point inside of
the plastic scintillator, and the probability of capture by Gd and the mean
time until the capture were estimated. The results of this study are presented
in Table 1. It should be noted here that all neutrons were captured by nuclei
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Table 1: Methods of Gd loading and neutron detection efficiency
methods neutron captured
by Gd[%]
mean time until
the capture [µs]
solution 0.1%wt 89.4 28.4
interleaving Gd foils and
plastic scintillator sheets of:
6 cm t 77.0 54.0
10 cm t 62.1 94.9
14 cm t 47.2 138
wrapping Gd foil over plas-
tic scintillator bars of:
6 cm  85.7 29.6
10 cm  76.0 62.4
14 cm  60.2 95.6
of hydrogen or gadolinium.
The simulation result showed that the segmented scintillators interleaved
with the gadolinium foils have performance comparable to the gadolinium
loaded plastic scintillators. Moreover the technique to produce clear and
colorless Gd loaded plastic scintillators is less established. Therefore we did
not choose to load gadolinium in scintillators.
Eventually we selected the square bar type module which has an ad-
vantage in detecting the positions of energy deposit and therefore energy
spectrum of the positrons, which is related directly to the neutrino energy
spectrum. The granularity of the modules was determined to be 10 cm×10 cm
7
Figure 4: The concept design of the PANDA antineutrino detector. The approximate total
target size is 1m3.
taking costs into consideration.
The design of the PANDA detector is shown in Fig. 4. The detector
consists of one hundred identical modules described above in this section.
As it has fine segmented structure, it becomes possible to use the event
topology information to tag anti-neutrino events and to discriminate them
from background.
The fine segmentation of the detector also gives the capability to identify
and reject passing tracks such as cosmic ray muons. Passing muons are char-
acterized by series of hits distributed along a line in the detector in addition
to its relatively large energy deposit. The characteristics helps the PANDA
detector to be designed without additional veto counters surrounding the
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Figure 5: The prototype detector, Lesser PANDA, consists of 16 modules.
whole detector.
As a first step before building the full-size PANDA detector, a smaller
prototype “Lesser PANDA” with 16 modules (Fig. 5) was constructed and
was tested by measuring environmental radiation at a commercial reactor.
This prototype was used to verify the background rejection ability of its
modular configuration with above-ground condition.
3. Electronics and Data Acquisition System
Fig. 6 shows the block diagram of the data acquisition and trigger system
for Lesser PANDA. Each PMT signal was divided into two (Fig. 7): 30% of
the original charge was sent to CAEN V792 multievent Charge-to-Digital-
Converters (QDCs) and the other 70% was passed to Technoland Corporation
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Figure 7: Circuit schematic of signal divider
N-TM 405 leading edge discriminators. Hardware thresholds were set at the
lower limit of N-TM 405 which were equivalent to about 150 keV of energy
deposit in the plastic scintillators at the far end of the corresponding PMTs.
Gates for the QDCs were produced by the following trigger logic. A hit
multiplicity was counted by a REPIC RPN-130 multiplicity logic module
and a logic pulse was sent to a gate generator whenever four or more PMTs
fired in coincidence with one another giving typical trigger rate of 2.7 kHz.
Non-retriggerable logic pulses of 400 ns duration were produced here. The
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coincidence width of the multiplicity logic was 50 ns. Although we did not
require the triggers to be both pairs of PMTs on two or more scintillator
modules, the two-pair condition was applied in the analysis phase. Corre-
sponding to each trigger, the charge outputs of all PMTs were recorded by
the QDCs. Meanwhile the trigger timing was recorded by a custom-made
time stamper.
We set up periodic pauses of the data acquisition to assure the synchro-
nism of the data from all the QDCs and the time stamper was retained.
During the pauses, the data acquisition system counted the number of the
collected data and when any mismatches between the QDCs or the time
stamper were found, the system discarded all the data after the previous
synchronization process.
Due to the conversion times of the QDCs (about 5.7µs) and synchroniza-
tion process, the DAQ system had about 3.5% dead time when the trigger
rate was 2.7 kHz. The QDCs have 32 event buffer memories and they incur
little dead time as long as the read out system can sustain the data rate.
The amount of data transferred from QDCs to PC was small enough (≈ 370
kByte/sec) at the assumed trigger rate; therefore the read out dead time was
negligible (< 0.01%).
The time stamper was implemented on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA running
at 50-MHz clock. The trigger timing information allows to calculate the
interval between a pair of events. The time stamper also recorded the timing
of the busy signals from QDCs which was used to calculate the dead time of
the measurements. These timing information was stored in a cache memory
on the FPGA once and sent to a hard disk drive sequentially via USB 2.0
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Figure 8: An example of energy spectrum in one module obtained with 60Co calibration
source after background subtraction, compared with the Geant4 simulation (dashed line).
(Universal Serial Bus 2.0). The data transfer speed of USB 2.0 is high enough
to run without dead time due to the time stamper at trigger rate of 2.7kHz.
Energy calibration of the detector was carried out using a 60Co gamma-
ray source temporarily placed at three different positions: the very center
of the detector or the centers of both the PMT sides. Calibration constants
were evaluated for each module separately.
Multiple Compton scattering of the gamma-rays with energies of 1.17MeV
and 1.33MeV in the detector or in the surrounding materials and statisti-
cal and electronic fluctuation of the output signals produce a broad spec-
tral feature in the measured energy spectrum (Fig. 8). To compare with
the measured energy spectrum, we performed a Monte Carlo simulation of
gamma-ray transports in the detector using Geant4[9].
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The calibration procedure was as follows: we took data with a 60Co
source; determined the values of the pedestals; fitted the broad spectral
feature by Compton scattering of 60Co gamma-rays of the simulation to the
three data at the same time taking into account the light attenuation de-
scribed in Section 2.
When the detector was in operation, relative gain drift of each mod-
ule was corrected using gamma-rays arising from natural radioactivity. The
background gamma-ray spectrum was taken just after the first calibration
as a reference and each data set was compared to it. The gain drift of each
PMT was 5.1% on root mean square and corrected every about 6 minutes.
Also the pedestals were monitored. The values of the pedestals were
determined from each data set. Since the signals from all modules were
digitized simultaneously when any four or more PMTs fired, a large num-
ber of recorded events for particular modules had zero energy and were a
measurement of the energy pedestal.
The DAQ systems were installed on a dry van with the detector. NTT
DoCoMo cell phone network was used for remote monitoring of the detector
health status. The remote connection to the system was also used to control
the detector system from a distance. The Lesser PANDA system typically
operated without physical intervention for two weeks.
4. Detector Simulation
We used Monte Carlo simulations to have insight into the particle trans-
port properties of the PANDA/Lesser PANDA detectors and to estimate the
ν¯e detection efficiencies of our detectors taking advantage of the fine segmen-
13
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Figure 9: (a): The antineutrino spectra from 239Pu and 235U as emitted by a reactor. (b):
Inverse beta decay cross section and detected antineutrino spectra which is the product
of the emitted spectra and the cross section. It assumes that a 1-kg plastic scintillator
detector at a standoff of 30m from the reactor core.
tation property to reject the background events.
The plot on (a) in Fig. 9 shows the predicted energy spectra of antineu-
trinos per fission for the two most important fissile isotopes 239Pu and 235U[1]
The plot (b) shows the same spectra after folded with the energy-dependent
cross section of the inverse beta decay. The folding is done by the equation:
Nν¯,i(Eν¯) =
TNp
4piD2
σ(Eν¯)φi(Eν¯). (6)
In this equation, Nν¯,i(Eν¯) is the number of antineutrino interactions per MeV
in the detector in a time interval T from the i-th isotope. In practice the
index runs over the four dominant fissioning isotopes 235U, 238U, 239Pu and
241Pu, which account for ∼99.9% of fissions in a typical reactor. Np is the
number of target protons in the detector, D is the distance from the detector
to the center of the reactor core. σ and φi are the cross section for the inverse
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beta interaction and the antineutrino number density per MeV and second for
the i-th isotope respectively. A cubic-meter-sized plastic scintillator detector
at a standoff of 30m from a reactor core is expected to measure ∼ 2.3× 103
events per day, for 3 GWt power plant and a perfectly efficient detector.
We simulated positrons and neutrons produced via the inverse beta decay
events uniformly distributed throughout the plastic scintillator volume, and
recorded the total visible energy in each module. The energy and angular
distributions of positrons and neutrons were derived from the inverse beta
decay angular-differential cross section depending on the antineutrino energy
Eν¯ [10] and spectra shown in Fig. 9.
We used the Geant4 simulation toolkit[9] for simulating the passage of
particles. To account for the optical photon response, we utilized the simple
light propagation model described in Section 2. We simulated particle trans-
port in the scintillators, the surrounding materials including the acrylic light
guides, the PMTs, the aluminized Mylar films and the gadolinium coated
Mylar films. Especially for the Lesser PANDA detector, the transport in the
outer aluminum and wooden support structures were also simulated.
We modeled the resolution of the digitized signal σsig(E) as
σsig(E) =
√
σ2electronics + σ
2
p.e.(E). (7)
Here, the constant σelectronics represents the effect of the electric noise of
the data acquisition system. It was determined by fitting the width of the
pedestal distribution. σp.e(E) ≡ k
√
E is the variation in response caused by
the finite number of photoelectrons generated in the event. Coefficient k for
each module came out of the module calibration described in Section 3.
We applied the selection cuts shown in Table 2 to the simulation outputs
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Table 2: The Antineutrino Event Selection Criterion
Prompt Energy 3MeV ≤ Etotal ≤ 10MeV
E1st ≤ 6MeV
200 keV ≤ E2nd ≤ 500 keV
Delayed Energy 3MeV ≤ Etotal ≤ 8MeV
E1st ≤ 5MeV
500 keV < E2nd
Prompt-delayed interval 6µs < tint < 200µs
Table 3: Detection Efficiency
Lesser PANDA PANDA
Target mass 160 kg 1000 kg
Detection efficiency 4.0% 11.6%
expected neutrino event rate
(at 30m from a 3 GWt reactor) 15/day 2.7× 102/day
Table 4: Detection Efficiency of Each Stage of the Criteria
Quantity Efficiency
Prompt 12%
Delayed 23%
time interval cut 89%
Total 4.0%
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and estimated the detection efficiency. Prompt and delayed events were
selected using the sum of the energy deposits of all the modules (Etotal), the
highest and the second highest values among all the modules (E1st, E2nd).
The threshold for the prompt total energy Etotal was placed at 3MeV so
that all background gamma-rays were rejected here. The energy distribution
of the antineutrino-generated positrons is directly related to the antineutrino
energy distribution therefore no events with Etotal beyond 10MeV (6MeV for
E1st) were admitted as extremely few antineutrino interactions were expected
above these energies. The E2nd condition was set to tag the gamma rays
created via annihilation of positrons.
The delayed total energy Etotal threshold was also placed at 3MeV. This
threshold was set as high as possible to reject background gamma rays and
low enough to retain as many delayed neutron events with cascading gamma
rays from neutron capture by Gd as possible. Events with delayed energy
of greater than 8MeV were also excluded, as the predicted delayed energy
was smaller than it. The E2nd threshold for delayed events was placed at
500 keV. Since more than one gamma rays with few MeV of energies are
emitted from neutron capture by Gd, there are comparatively large number
of events with E2nd greater than 500 keV. For the same reason, it is unlikely
for the gamma rays to deposit such a large quantity of energy in one module.
Therefore events with E1st greater than 5MeV were discarded.
All values for the energy criteria were finally verified comparing energy
spectra from the detector simulation and the background measurement. The
detection efficiencies were comparatively insensitive to the energy cuts around
these thresholds.
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Figure 10: (a): Typical particle trajectories and energy deposit in the full size PANDA
detector of a simulated antineutrino prompt event seen from the PMT side of the detector.
(b): Corresponding delayed event.
The detection efficiency is also affected by the prompt-delayed interval
cut. The interval distribution of antineutrino interactions is described by an
exponential decay. According to the simulation result, the time constant of
the exponential is about 60µs and the interval cut of 200µs means that only
about 10% of the neutrino events are lost by this selection.
Table 3 shows the resulting total detection efficiencies and the expected
event rates for the Lesser PANDA and the PANDA detectors. Table 4 shows
the estimated efficiencies of each stage of our selection criteria.
Fig. 10 shows a typical simulated antineutrino event detected by the full
size PANDA detector. A hit by a positron and one of two annihilation gamma
rays are seen in the prompt event. Multiple hits of gamma rays emitted by
Gd are also seen in the delayed event after 13 µs of the prompt event.
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5. Background measurement
Ahead of the measurement at the commercial reactor, the Lesser PANDA
detector was tested for two days in the van near the university building for
background measurement. We counted the number of neutrino-like back-
ground events which are hardly distinguishable from the neutrino interaction
and it amounted 981± 82 events/day.
The number of neutrino-like events were calculated as follows. First, we
counted the number of events which satisfied all the selection criteria de-
scribed in Table 2. Then we counted the number of accidental coincidences
by applying the same criteria except for the prompt-delayed interval, which
was changed to 1006µs < tint < 1200µs. The difference of these two num-
bers represents the number of events whose prompt and delayed signals had
some correlation. We considered these correlated events as the neutrino-like
backgrounds. The operation did not reduce the detection efficiency signifi-
cantly. The subtraction of the accidental coincidence was important for our
analysis because of fluctuating gamma-ray background especially during the
measurement at the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant described below due to
radioactive dust which originated in the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant
accident.
The detector was then deployed at Unit 3 of the Hamaoka Nuclear Power
Plant of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. There are three operational reactors
in this station; all of them are boiling water reactors and have maximum
thermal (electric) power of 3.3–3.9GWt (1.1–1.4GWe) each. The detector
was located by the reactor building of Unit 3 (3.3GWt) at a distance of 39.8m
from the reactor core. The Unit 3 reactor was under scheduled inspection
19
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Figure 11: Daily number of correlated background events which satisfied the antineutrino
selection criteria. Error bars are only statistical.
and was not in operation then 2.
During a 70-day period of the background measurement, the average daily
rate of neutrino-like events was distributed at 888±70 events/day. The stan-
dard deviation is somewhat greater than the statistics due to as yet unknown
reason. These events are comprised of non-antineutrino backgrounds. We ob-
served no significant excess in the count rate compared to the rate measured
near the university building.
A linear fit to the daily detection rate of antineutrino like events during
reactor off period plotted versus day has a slope of 0.06 ± 0.36 events/day2
(Fig. 11), which is consistent with a constant background.
The van with the detector on it was parking as close as possible to the
2 We intended to measure the event rate change before and after a start up of the reactor
when the inspection were over, but it did not start because of the general shutdown request
by the Prime Minister after the Fukushima-1 nuclear power plant accident.
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reactor building. There were no connections between the detector and the
reactor building except a 100-volt AC power line, which supplied about 600
W of electricity for the whole detector system.
A hard disk drive with event data was replaced every two weeks and was
carried back to Tokyo for the analysis. The detector system was otherwise
operated without a human intervention throughout the period, and its status
was monitored from the university in Tokyo via the cell phone network.
6. Discussion and conclusions
We proposed a new type of segmented antineutrino detector made of one
hundred plastic scintillator bars wrapped in Gd-coated films for the nuclear
safeguard application. The detector is all solid states and nonflammable.
It is comparatively small, can be carried easily in a van and is intended to
monitor a reactor from outside of the reactor building.
As a first step, a smaller prototype was built and tested near the university
building and also near the reactor building of the nuclear power plant. The
measured background rates were comparable on both the sites. We have
shown that an unmanned operation is possible for a few months only with
biweekly hard disk drive exchanges for the data collection.
A detailed Monte Carlo simulation code was developed for both the full
size and prototype detectors. A detection efficiency of 11.6% and 4.0% were
estimated for the full size and prototype detectors, respectively. Clearly,
it would be hard to detect statistically significant number of antineutrino
events with the prototype detector because of its low detection efficiency and
relatively high measured background rate although current selection criteria
21
are not fully optimized yet.
With the full-size detector of effective target mass of 1 ton, we have a
good chance to detect sufficient number of antineutrino events at reasonable
standoff from commercial nuclear power stations.
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